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Something closely analogous to this does unquestionably exist within
the limits of a single life, and can be perceived by direct observation.
When a personal relation has existed for many years, many of the events
which formed its temporal content, and had importance and significance
at the time, are completely forgotten. But we do not regard them as lost,
for we recognize that each of them has done its part in moulding the
relationship which exists at present. And so they are preserved pre-
served indeed far more perfectly than they could be in memory. For, in
memory, each of them would be a mere potentiality, except in the mo-
ment when it was actually thought of, while, as factors of disposition,
they are all permanently real.
60. I am not denying it would certainly be useless to deny that,
to a man who is living a particular life in time, the prospect that he will
cease to remember that life even by transcending memory will al-
ways appear a loss and a breach of continuity. Arguments may convince
him that this is a delusion, but they will not remove the feeling. Nor is it
to be expected that this should be otherwise. A Synthesis can only be
seen to preserve the true value of its terms in so far as we have attained
to the standpoint of the Synthesis. And so a process towards perfection
can never be perfectly painless. For the surrender of imperfection could
only be quite painless to the perfect individual, and till the process is
completed he is not perfect.
Chapter III: The Personality of the Absolute
61. The question whether there is a God has attracted much attention,
for the ordinary definition of God makes the question both important
and doubtful. But, according to Hegel s use of the word God, it ceases
to he either doubtful or important. For he defines God as the Absolute
Reality, whatever that reality may turn out to he. To question the exist-
ence of such a God as this is impossible. For to deny it would mean the
denial that there was any reality at all. This would be contradictory, for
what, in that case, would happen to the denial itself? But the same rea-
sons which make the existence of such a God quite certain make it also
quite trivial. For it tells us nothing except that there is some reality
somewhere. We must know of what nature that reality is, if our convic-
tion of its existence is to have any interest, either for theory or practice.
Thus Hegel s treatment of God s existence and nature will proceed
differently from that which is generally employed. The common plan is
to use the word to connote certain definite attributes, and then to enquire
if a being answering to this description really exists. But Hegel defines
God to mean whatever really exists, and then the important question is
to determine the nature of this reality. Instead of  Is there a God? we
must ask  What is God s nature?
In ordinary usage, and in the usage also of many philosophers, the
word God connotes, among other attributes, personality. And on the
personality of God depend most of the other attributes commonly as-
cribed to him. An impersonal being could be omnipotent, indeed, and
could  work for righteousness. It could also be rational, in the sense
that its nature was such as to present an harmonious and coherent whole
52/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
to the reason of the observer. But an impersonal being could not be wise
or good. It could not love men. Nor could the emotions of acquiescence
and admiration with which men might regard it be sufficiently like the
emotions of one man towards another to merit the name of love. Cer-
tainly they would be very different emotions from those with which the
believers in a personal God regard him.
For the ordinary conception of God, then, the attribute of personal-
ity seems of paramount importance. And so, when we are considering
Hegel s system, the question  Does God exist? may be fairly turned
into the question  Is God a person? Unquestionably Hegel regards God
as infinite, as a unity, as spirit, as making for reason and righteousness.
If we add personality to these qualities we have the ordinary conception
of God. On the other hand, if we deny the personality, we get the con-
ception of a being to whom, in ordinary language, the name of God
would not be applied.
But what exactly is meant by personality? I may know, though it is
difficult to define, what I mean when I say that I am a person. But it is
clear that the nature of an infinite and perfect being must be very differ-
ent from mine. And within what limits must this difference be confined,
if that infinite and perfect being is to be called a person?
The characteristic which determines personality seems, on the whole,
to be generally placed in the  I  the synthetic unity of apperception.
When a being distinguishes itself from its content when, in other words,
it finds in that content an element which is never absent, though never
present in isolation, which is always the same, and whose presence de-
termines the content to be the content of that particular being, then we
call that being personal. I know that I can say  I am. I know that a
College cannot say  I am. If we conceive that it is consistent with
God s nature to say  I am, we shall hold that God is a person, but not
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